> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://openclaw.ai2me.io/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Initial access (AML.TA0004)

Threats in the initial access tactic (AML.TA0004) of the [MITRE ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/) framework. Each entry lists the ATLAS technique, attack vector, affected components, current mitigations, residual risk, and recommendations.

The trust boundaries and data flows these threats cross are defined in the [threat model index](/security/THREAT-MODEL-ATLAS), which also holds the risk matrix, the recommendations summary, and the ATLAS technique mapping.

## T-ACCESS-001: Pairing code interception

| Attribute | Value |
| - | - |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| **Description** | Attacker intercepts a pairing code during the pairing window (1h DM/generic pairing, 5m node pairing) |
| **Attack vector** | Shoulder surfing, network sniffing, social engineering |
| **Affected components** | Device pairing system |
| **Current mitigations** | 1h TTL (DM/generic pairing), 5m TTL (node pairing); codes sent via the existing channel |
| **Residual risk** | Medium - pairing window exploitable |
| **Recommendations** | Reduce pairing window, add a confirmation step |

## T-ACCESS-002: AllowFrom spoofing

| Attribute | Value |
| - | - |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| **Description** | Attacker spoofs an allowed sender identity on a channel |
| **Attack vector** | Channel-dependent - phone number spoofing, username impersonation |
| **Affected components** | Per-channel AllowFrom validation |
| **Current mitigations** | Channel-specific identity verification; graded identifier-authentication gate uses `min(entry, subject)` over `verified > asserted > unverified > mutable` with exact match provenance and default minimum `asserted` (#123782/#123793). Channels declare per-identifier strength; security audit warns on inert mutable entries (#131129). |
| **Residual risk** | Medium - some channels remain vulnerable to spoofing |
| **Recommendations** | Continue per-channel `verified` adoption and downstream strength mappers; document channel-specific risks |

## T-ACCESS-003: Token theft

| Attribute | Value |
| - | - |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| **Description** | Attacker steals authentication tokens from config/credential files |
| **Attack vector** | Malware, unauthorized device access, config backup exposure |
| **Affected components** | Channel/provider credential storage, config storage |
| **Current mitigations** | File permissions |
| **Residual risk** | High - tokens stored in plaintext on disk |
| **Recommendations** | Implement token encryption at rest, add token rotation |


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